parents involved in community schools v seattle 2007 quizlet

The opinion of the Court and Justice Breyers dissenting opinion (hereinafter dissent) describe in detail the history of integration efforts in Louisville and Seattle. The Court need not resolve the parties dispute over whether racial diversity in schools has a marked impact on test scores and other objective yardsticks or achieves intangible socialization benefits because it is clear that the racial classifications at issue are not narrowly tailored to the asserted goal. Nothing but an interest in classroom aesthetics and a hypersensitivity to elite sensibilities justifies the school districts racial balancing programs. This Court has made many decisions of widespread effect; none would affect more people more directly in more fundamental interests and, in fact, cause more chaos in local government than a reversal of the decision in this case). In making such a determination, we have deferred to state authorities only once, see Grutter, 539 U. S., at 328330, and that deference was prompted by factors uniquely relevant to higher education. The District points out that because it receives federal funding, it is prohibited from taking any action which has a discriminatory effect on participation in educational programs. Since school assignments decided purely on the basis of distance from the school would mean that few minority students would be admitted to the most popular schools, the District contends it is required to take steps to integrate the schools. See Tr. [Footnote 9] We have made it unusually clear that strict scrutiny applies to every racial classification. Order No. Educational Research 531, 550 (1994) (hereinafter Wells & Crain). See, e.g., Powell, Living and Learning: Linking Housing and Education, in Pursuit of a Dream Deferred: Linking Housing and Education Policy 15, 35 (J. Powell, G. Kearney, & V. Kay eds. Before the merits of the case can be addressed, the Court first has to address the Districts jurisdictional challenge that no case or controversy exists within the Constitutional sense of those terms. (b)Despite the districts assertion that they employed individual racial classifications in a way necessary to achieve their stated ends, the minimal effect these classifications have on student assignments suggests that other means would be effective. Though this may oversimplify the matter a bit, one of the main concerns underlying those opinions was this: If it is legitimate for school authorities to work to avoid racial isolation in their schools, must they do so only by indirection and general policies? 5. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 26869. Neither of the programs before us today is compelled as a remedial measure, and no one makes such a claim. Compare Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 809810 (CA1 1998) (Boudin, J., concurring), with Comfort, 418 F. 3d, at 2829 (Boudin, C.J., concurring). Independent School Dist., 719 S.W. 2d 350, 352-353 (Ct. App. But if the plan was lawful when it was first adopted and if it was lawful the day before the District Court dissolved its order, how can the plurality now suggest that it became unlawful the following day? Research J., No. See, e.g., App. Many parents, white and black alike, want their children to attend schools with children of different races. 05908, pp. School districts that had engaged in de jure segregation had an affirmative constitutional duty to desegregate; those that were de facto segregated did not. Nonetheless, in light of Grutter and other precedents, see, e.g., Bakke, 438 U. S., at 290 (opinion of Powell, J. Eighty-four students were assigned to schools that they did not list as a choice, but 29 of those students would have been assigned to their respective school without the racial tiebreaker, and 3 were able to attend one of the oversubscribed schools due to waitlist and capacity adjustments. See also Grutter, supra, at 326 ([G]overnmental action based on racea group classification long recognized as in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibitedshould be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted)). This Court has carved out a narrow exception to that general rule for cases in which a school district has a history of maintaining two sets of schools in a single school system deliberately operated to carry out a governmental policy to separate pupils in schools solely on the basis of race.[Footnote 4] See Swann, 402 U. S., at 56. Here Roberts provides the following string citation: Here, Roberts provides the following string cite: Id., at 337, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 156 L. Ed. This approach is just as wrong today as it was a half-century ago. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (U.S. 2007). 1725, 2841. of Ed. Pp. Regardless of the constitutional validity of such remediation, see Croson, supra, at 524525 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment), it does not apply here. And it thereby set the Nation on a path toward pub-lic school integration. The plurality refers to no case in support of its demand. We rely, as did the lower courts, largely on data from the 20002001 school year in evaluating the plan. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion). Todays opinion reveals that the plurality would rewrite this Courts prior jurisprudence, at least in practical application, transforming the strict scrutiny test into a rule that is fatal in fact across the board. Student Choice and Project Renaissance, 1991 to 1996. Though the dissent cites every manner of complaint, record material, and scholarly article relating to Seattles race-based student assignment efforts, post, at 7375, it cites no law or official policy that required separation of the races in Seattles schools. 05908, at 30a. When the court made this determination in 2000, it did so in the context of the Louisville desegregation plan that the board had adopted in 1996. The question was originally brought up by the Ninth Circuit independently of the parties (377 F.3d 949 at 958) and the School District has now adopted that argument as its own before the Court. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 373374 (1886). Similarly, in Zaslawsky v. Bd. What has happened to stare decisis? See supra, at 3745. Like the University of Michigan undergraduate plan struck down in Gratz, 539 U. S., at 275, the plans here do not provide for a meaningful individualized review of applicants but instead rely on racial classifications in a nonindividualized, mechanical way. To make race matter now so that it might not matter later may entrench the very prejudices we seek to overcome. Indeed, the social scientists brief rather cautiously claims the existence of any benefit at all, describing the positive impact as modest, id., at 13, acknowledging that there appears to be little or no effect on math scores, id., at 14, and admitting that the underlying reasons for these gains in achievement are not entirely clear, id., at 15. at 12. This interest, the Court said, can be achieved by considering the student overall, not just his or her race, and the contribution he or she can make to the schools diversity. Narrow tailoring requires "serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives", Grutter, supra, at 339, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 156 L. Ed. Each plan embodies the results of local experience and community consultation. Accord, post, at 68 (Today, almost 50 years later, attitudes toward race in this Nation have changed dramatically. I agree with The Chief Justice that we have jurisdiction to decide the cases before us and join Parts I and II of the Courts opinion. The Court split 414 on key aspects of the case, with Justice Kennedy writing the swing vote opinion and agreeing with four Justices (Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito) that the programs used by Seattle and Louisville did not pass constitutional muster (because the districts failed to demonstrate that their plans were sufficiently narrowly tailored), but Kennedy also found, along with four Justices (Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg), that compelling interests exist in avoiding racial isolation and promoting diversity. 05915, at 81. Because equal protection on the basis of race is at issue, the applicable standard of review to be applied in this case is strict scrutiny, as both parties agree, and as is well established in the Courts prior case law. The Courts misuse of the three-tiered approach to Equal Protection analysis merely reconfirms my own view that there is only one such Clause in the Constitution. Ostate-imposed desegregation could only be brought about by busing children across school districts. The plurality opinion is at least open to the interpretation that the Constitution requires school districts to ignore the problem of de facto resegregation in schooling. So it was, as the dissent observes, see post, at 1314, that Louisville classified children by race in its school assignment and busing plan in the 1970s. of Oral Arg. The Court also found that the magnet programs available at the high school in question were not available at other high schools in the school district. In other words, it will always be important for students to learn cooperation among the races. Electoral district lines are facially race neutral so a more searching inquiry is necessary before strict scrutiny can be found applicable in redistricting cases than in cases of classifications based explicitly on race (quoting Adarand, 515 U. S., at 213)). in No. Today we enjoy a society that is remarkable in its openness and opportunity. In cases where an opinion or parts of an opinion do not reach a majority, the narrower opinion represents the holding, so Justice Kennedy's opinion represents parts of the holding of the case. Richmond v. J. There is a cruel irony in The Chief Justices reliance on our decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294 (1955). It then created a mixed student body by assigning to those schools students who would otherwise attend predominantly white, or predominantly black, schools elsewhere. At the same time, transport from house to school involved extensive busing, with about half of all students attending a school other than the one closest to their home. The history of the plans before us, their educational importance, their highly limited use of raceall these and moremake clear that the compelling interest here is stronger than in Grutter. Though Brown decisively rejected those arguments, todays dissent replicates them to a distressing extent. 3, p.17 (The Court is dealing with thousands of local school districts and schools. The Ninth Circuit below stated that it share[d] in the hope expressed in Grutter that in 25 years racial preferences would no longer be necessary to further the interest identified in that case. (a)As part of its burden of proving that racial classifications are narrowly tailored to further compelling interests, the government must establish, in detail, how decisions based on an individual students race are made in a challenged program. This Court recognized as much in its opinion, which stated that the school board had an affirmative duty to disestablish the dual school system. McDaniel, supra, at 41. The racial makeup of the school population amounted to 43% white, 24% black, and 23% Asian or Pacific Islander, with Hispanics and Native Americans making up the rest. Seattle Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. By 1991, the board had concluded that assigning elementary school students to two or more schools during their elementary school years had proved educationally unsound and, if continued, would undermine Kentuckys newly adopted Education Reform Act.

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